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Time for a New Law on Health Care
Advance Directives
by
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER*
During the last decade, states have enacted three different kinds
of documents to deal with health care of incompetent patients. The
legislation's main impetus and central focus have been to provide a
procedure to approve life support termination in appropriate cases,
although it also addresses other health care concerns. The earliest of
the statutes was a natural death act, which authorizes a directive, pop-
ularly called a living will, to physicians. The second was a general
durable power of attorney, sometimes in the form of a specially crafted
health care durable power of attorney, which essentially empowers an
appointed agent to make appropriate decisions for an incompetent
patient. The agent is bound by directions contained in the appointing
power. Finally, some states have enacted family consent laws em-
powering others, typically family, to decide health care matters absent
a directive or power of attorney to guide them. At the end of 1990,
Congress gave these laws new importance by mandating their obser-
vance.
The statutes differ;1 provisions of one form conflict with pro-
visions of another form. 2 Most contradictions raise problems, some
nettlesome, others destructive of important interests. After more than
a decade of experience with such forms, it is time to review the present
state of the laws and to coordinate and debug them. In the author's
view, a single statute incorporating the best of each of the three types
of law is now in order. This Article suggests guidelines for that effort.
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; A.B., J.D. University of Pennsylvania;
L.L.M., J.S.D. Yale. Professor Alexander has been active in organizations concerned with
elder law, having chaired the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the A.B.A. and California
Committees on Legal Problems of the Elderly, and vice-chaired the A.B.A. Commission on
Legal Problems of the Elderly. He has written two books and numerous articles in the field.
The author thanks his research assistants, Kathleen Roberts and Stephen K. Meyer, for their
tireless research in support of this Article.
1. See Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right
to Die," 77 Ky. L.J. 319, 335 (1989).
2. See generally Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need for Reform,
17 FLA. ST. U.L. Ray. 519 (1990) (arguing that Florida's durable power of attorney law is
not in harmony with the 1989 guardianship reforms).
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The Article builds on the assumption that the state primarily is
interested in assisting patients to control their own medical destinies.
Regrettably, it is not clear that all present law is so premised, but there
are powerful reasons it should be. Paternalism often has been re-
pudiated domestically, but is now on the defensive throughout much
of the world.
Human autonomy is expressing itself as a paramount concern even
in places that would have seemed unlikely spawning grounds just a
few years ago.3 Whatever else can be concluded about this develop-
ment, it should be recognized that the desire for self-expression is a
universal trait of overwhelming significance. National paternalism
stands repudiated despite the substantial efforts of many governments
to meet the needs of their constituents. The democracy wave has sub-
stituted its amalgam of wills for national planning.
Within the United States one hardly need compose a brief for self-
governance. This country began as a noble experiment in universal
suffrage over two hundred years ago. Despite an unswerving devotion
to democratic principles, however, the country has had to awaken it-
self to the limits of popular participation. For almost a century, blacks
were disenfranchised; 4 for a longer period, the same was true of
women.5 It is not always self-evident that pockets of powerlessness
remain.
Among those presently disenfranchised are those said to be in-
competent. Chief in that group are the frail elderly. Of course, because
the elderly are our parents and friends we have not devised a system
demonstrably uncaring. We simply have substituted the voices of the
elderly with that of court appointed agents-normally called guard-
ians, conservators, or a variety of less common names ("conserva-
tors")-allowing the conservators to plan the welfare of their wards.
Some conservators are deeply sensitive and compassionate. They usu-
ally are shocked when accused of working against the interests of their
wards. Self-determination, however, is no less desired locally than it
is nationally. Conservatorship has failed repeatedly. It is in a constant
state of "reform," but reform does not alter its fatal flaw: 6 conser-
vatorship deprives the elderly of their cherished freedom to decide.
3. See, e.g., Raufman, Tunnel at End of the Light for Eastern Europe; Upheaval in
Eastern Europe One Year Later, Boston Globe, Oct. 21, 1990, National/Foreign, at 1;
Reunification of Germany, L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at B6, col. 2.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (enacted in 1870, disallowing the denial of the right to
vote based on racial grounds).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (enacted in 1920, disallowing the denial of the right to
vote based on gender).
6. Alexander, Avoiding Guardianship, _J. ELDER ABUSE -. 1990) (forthcoming).
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Conservatorship has failed not only theoretically7 but practically
as well. Indeed, the abuses of the sixties appear to be the abuses of
the nineties.8 In the late seventies the author suggested adopting ad-
vance directives as an alternative to depriving people of their deci-
sionmaking authority in the face of their declining capacities. 9 An
advance directive enables a competent person to govern what happens
after incompetency.
The idea of the advance directive was to create a document that
would adopt the free form of contracts and express the will of its maker
in Ithe maker's terms.10 What has emerged is far more complicated.
Government again has asserted itself in the conditions that attach to
the documents.
The rationale .for advance directives is, of course, their enhance-
ment of autonomy: they enable persons to protect their futures by
foreclosing the plans of others to determine their destinies. In that
respect, they fundamentally differ from conservatorships. Both con-
servatorship and advance directives attempt to deal with problems aris-
ing in a future in which the person is unable to make competent
decisions. Conservatorship imposes societal solutions and a court ap-
pointed enforcer. 12 Advance directives, however, provide either an agent
to enforce a patient's stated desires or instruct physicians how their
patient wants to be treated.
To some extent, forms of directives are a product of their history.
The earliest type of law enacted to authorize directives, the natural
death act, was popularly named a living will. The author has referred
to durable powers of attorney for health care, the next set of direc-
tives, as second generation living wills. The new proposal embodied
7. As I have written about the abuses of conservatorships for a quarter of a century, I
shall not repeat the discussion other than to refer the reader to a sampling of prior comments:
G. ALEXANDER, WRrrING A Lna WIL: USING A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (1988)
[hereinafter WRITING A Lrinvo WIL]; G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWmI, Tan AGED AND TIM NEED
FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT (1972) [hereinafter SunRooATE MANAGEMENT]; Alexander, Death
by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67 (1988) [hereinafter Death by Directive]; Alexander,
Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 1003 (1979) [hereinafter Premature Probate].
8. Compare SutrouGAT MANAGEAENT, supra note 7, at 9 (hypothesizing that "surrogate
management ... is conducted in the specific interest of some person other than the incom-
petent" with Friedman & Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in California,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 285 (1988) (noting that conservatorships sometimes are sought to
protect the interests of the conservator rather than the ward).
9. See Premature Probate, supra note 7, at 1031.
10. Id. at 1018.
11. See id. at 1006.
12. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800.3 (West Supp. 1991) (authorizes court to appoint
a conservator of the person or estate of an adult).
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in this Article is for a third generation living will incorporating the
first directive and its improvements.
Each of the three types of documents has an important function,
and the three varieties can coexist fairly well despite their independent
enactments and lack of extensive cross-referencing. Combining their
provisions into a single law would clarify the alternative methods of
health care decision making for incompetent persons.
Following the prominent plight of Karen Quinlan,'3 California led
the country in passing a law designed to allow patients in terminal
stages of disease to give directives to physicians to inform them of the
patients' desires concerning life support. 4 Currently, natural death
acts modelled on that law exist in forty-two other states.' 5 California
13. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (with
concurrence of guardian and family, no criminal or civil liability may attach for discontinuation
of life support of patient in persistent vegetative state upon medical determination of no
reasonable possibility of recovery and after consultation with hospital ethics committee or
similar body).
14. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990).
15. See Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1981); Alaska Rights
of the Terminally Ill, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1990); Arizona Medical Treatment
Decision Act, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -10 (1986 & Supp. 1989); Arkansas Rights
of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -202
(1987 & Supp. 1989); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-
101 to -113 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1990); Delaware Patient's Right to Terminate
Treatment, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death
Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); Florida Right to Decline Life-
Prolonging Procedures, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West 1986); Georgia Living Wills Act,
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112 (Harrison 1986 & Supp. 1989); Hawaii Medical Treatment
Decisions Act, HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Natural Death Act,
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701-710 (1988); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures
Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act,
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.I-.11 (West 1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-28,101-,109 (1985); Louisiana Declaration Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA.
Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299:58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1990); Maine Living Wills, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1989); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures, MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions, MIN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1990); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Me-
chanisms, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1990); Missouri Declarations, Life-
Support, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Montana Living Will Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1989); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Procedures, NEV. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540-.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989);
New Hampshire Terminal Care Document, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (Supp.
1989); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); North
Carolina Right to Natural Death; Brain Death, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1989);
North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14
(Supp. 1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West
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also was the leader in enacting second generation living wills, durable
powers of attorney for health care.' 6 Thirty-two states have adopted
second generation living wills 7 and further adoptions are almost cer-
tain. In addition, general durable power of attorney laws were pressed
into similar service in several states by amendments expressly providing
that the laws govern health care decisions as well.' 8 Finally, a third
round of laws' 9 recently has been passed appointing members of the
Supp. 1990); Oregon Directive to Physician, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (Supp. 1990);
South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989); South Dakota Health Care Consent Procedures, S.D. CODuiED LAws ANN. §§
34-12C-1 to -8 (Supp. 1990); Tennessee Right to a Natural Death Act (Living Wills), TEM.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990); Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. HEATH &
SArTY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Utah Personal Choice and Living
Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1989); Vermont Terminal Care
Document, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1990); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15
(West 1989); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988).
16. See CAL. Cw. CODE § 2400 (West Supp. 1989).
17. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (1989); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2431 (West Supp. 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2201 (1989); 1990 Fla. Laws
223; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-1 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16.8-12-5 (Burns
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7(1)(a) (West 1989); 1989 Kan. Sess. Laws 181; 1990 Ky.
Acts 123; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1990); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145(B).01 (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-151 (Supp. 1990); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 449.810 (Michie Supp. 1989); 1990 N.Y. Laws 752; Oaso REv. CODE ANN. §
1337.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.510 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
4.10-1 (1989); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 59-7-2.5 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-
202 (Supp. 1990); Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1105 to -1106 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3453 (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2986(2) (1988); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.94.046 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-30A-3 (Supp. 1990); 1989 Wis. Laws 200; Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102 (1988).
These laws differ from state to state in several significant respects, some of which are
addressed below.
18. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.94.046 (Supp. 1990).
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2210 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.304 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4303
(1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-3-3 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 255.11 (West 1985);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1986); N.Y.
PuB. HEAL LAW § 2972 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-77-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12C-3 (Supp.
1990); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1107 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988); WAH. REv. CODE ANN. §
7.70.065 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-5c-5a (Supp. 1990).
These family consent laws allow the appointment of specified family members as health
care surrogates without court intervention.
family as health surrogates in the absence of a prior writing by an
incompetent patient. 20
Of course, advance directives are not necessary for everyone. To
the extent that one trusts the conservatorship process, there is little
cause to make a directive, aside from avoiding the expense of ob-
taining the conservatorship appointment. Thus, a directive requiring
acts that would not be expected from a conservator should be treated
as a probable rejection of the conservatorship remedy. For example,
directions to buy speculative stocks, to sell personal jewelry absent
financial pressure to do so, to administer experimental drugs or per-
form experimental surgery, and certainly to remove life support would
seem to indicate a knowing choice of outcomes that could not be ex-
pected from state administration.
A patient may create an advance directive merely to inform phy-
sicians of the patient's wishes, but that effort is hardly worthwhile if
the desired treatment is ordinary care. To the extent a patient makes
a choice among acceptable alternatives, the patient appears also to
make a decision not to allow others to make that choice. Even if a
patient makes a directive out of concern that the state would not deal
with her medical needs by appointing a conservator, such a directive
probably would be limited to facilitating the appointment of either a
conservator or an agent. She thereby could not account for other pro-
visions. Thus, having made a directive, especially a detailed one, a
person should be assumed to have chosen self-direction over pater-
nalistic care. As a corollary, the state should not impose a conservator
in the alleged best interests of the ward since the ward has indicated
that she considers the directive to be a superior method of guiding
care.
21
Probate is an apt analogy here. 22 Probate law provides for two
forms of distribution upon death. If a person cares to have control
over how the estate is distributed, she writes a will. There are nu-
merous limits on what can be directed,23 but in the main, property
passes as the testator wished. If there is no valid will, the state provides
20. The list of cases is growing in which courts attempt to achieve a result appropriate
for a particular patient without the benefit of an advance directive. For a discussion of these
cases, see Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 86-92.
21. This analysis depends on whether the maker understands the consequences of her acts
and knows about available alternatives. If this is an incorrect assumption about a substantial
number of present directives, it certainly would become a more correct assumption under the
author's proposed new law.
22. See Premature Probate, supra note 7, at 1018.
23. For example, a testator may not intentionally omit a surviving spouse from her will
or bequeath the family house to the detriment of her surviving spouse and children. J. RITCHIE,
N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 146, 152, 182 (7th ed. 1989).
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for distribution by intestacy.24 The state's purpose is to get property
into the right hands and to settle the estate by using the state's con-
ception of what most people would (or should) want. If one likes the
state's distribution scheme there is little reason to expend the time and
money to make a will.
Most states appear to have modelled advance directives in this
manner. Several expressly have indicated that the purpose of the di-
rective is to avoid conservatorship or have provided ways to avoid the
interference of a conservator if one is appointed.2 Others have adopted
the contrary position and have subordinated an agent appointed by
a directive to a conservator.2 Subordination, of course, invalidates the
choice not to accept statutory solutions because the conservator likely
will be bound to the state's general principles governing conserva-
torship rather than to the terms of the advance directive. At a min-
imum, the maker is deprived of the choice of administrator and,
consequently, the guarantee of her chosen outcomes.
Subordination should run in the opposite direction. If a person
appoints an agent under an advance directive, a court should appoint
a conservator, if at all, only for matters not governed by the directive.
Since conservatorship is established for those who cannot properly
arrange for their needs, making an advance directive that appoints a
person to satisfy needs arguably obviates the need for an additional
appointment. 27
Of course, conservatorship can be viewed and actually can func-
tion as a means of checking abuses by durable power agents or phy-
sicians. As a solution to the problem of abuse, however, conservatorship
is grossly overbroad. Other ways exist to chasten errant delegatees.
Statutes generally provide for court review of the handling of an ad-
vance directive on a petition supported by evidence of abuse.2 Fi-
nancial agents routinely are required to give accountings as conservators
presently are required to do. 29 The directive itself might require the
agent to be accountable to a named person or group on penalty of
losing the agency in favor of an alternate agent. If a maker is par-
ticularly concerned about interference with her wishes, however, there
24. Id. at 85.
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(c) (Harrison 1990).
26. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-112 (1989); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 subdiv.
3 (West Supp. 1990).
27. Cf. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 374, 205 N.E.2d 435, 443 (1965) (holding
that it is unconstitutional to appoint a conservator without notifying a patient to obtain
consent to a blood transfusion if such transfusions are against the patient's religion).
28. See, e.g., CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 2431-2444 (West Supp. 1991).
29. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2620 (West Supp. 1991).
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should be a method (though not an easy one) for making an advance
directive unchallengeable. For example, one might borrow from the
California Durable Power of Attorney law30 the provision rendering
difficult a challenge to the directive if an attorney has attested that
she has fully informed the maker of the meaning of its provisions. 3'
Also, the state should allow the potential ward to nominate a con-
servator if one is to be appointed. 32 One can anticipate and block some
overreaching by disqualifying people such as health care providers and
nursing home operators from accepting agency in an advance direc-
tive. 33 Naturally, any such disqualification deprives the maker of some
degree of free choice, but the disqualification can be justified by the
anticipated conflict of interest that otherwise might result.
Although most of the present legislative restrictions to autono-
mous choice are contained in natural death acts, there are similar com-
plications in the durable powers of attorney statutes as well. 34 The
principal focus of many of these restrictions has been on what is pop-
ularly called the right to die.35 As impediments to autonomous choice,
these restrictions must be reexamined.
To be sure, each state has an interest in the life and welfare of
its citizens. The state's interest in a patient's life, according to the
United States Supreme Court, is compelling. 36 Since many issues con-
cerning the health care of incompetent patients, especially life support
termination, are complex and difficult, it is understandable that var-
ious states arrive at different compromises among competing inter-
ests.3 7 The clashing viewpoints on life support termination make it
unlikely that there will be universal agreement. 38 The fact that most
30. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2400-2423 (West Supp. 1991).
31. See id. § 2421.
32. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 subdiv. 3 (West 1989).
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-5(b) (Harrison 1990).
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2435 (West Supp. 1991) (A durable power of attorney
may not authorize the attorney-in-fact to consent to commitment of the principal to a mental
health facility, or to consent to shock therapy, psychosurgery, sterilization, or abortion on
behalf of the principal.).
35. For example, some states restrict the removal of hydration and nutrition or require
that patients be terminally ill before a directive's provisions apply. See generally Mayo,
Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die, " 49 MD. L. Rsv. 103 (1990) (arguing that the consti-
tutional right of privacy does not extend to decisions made on behalf of permanently
unconscious patients to have life-sustaining treatment discontinued and that continued state
supervision is appropriate).
36. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
(upholding a state's right to require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wish in
proceedings in which a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person
diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state).
37. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 77-79.
38. See Note, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical Personnel Confronting
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
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(perhaps all) states agree that a terminal patient who desires treatment
stopped and has clearly and competently so indicated has a right to
refuse further medical aid39 provides support for at least a provision
of this type in a new law. Claims of a state interest in life or preventing
suicide seem fairly feeble in this context. 40
There are, of course, other concerns about authorizing patient
autonomy respecting the right to die. Aside from the strong moral and
religious opposition, 4' such permission might lead to disguised murder.
More commonly, it surely would create psychological pressure on the
patient to stop the expense, both financial and emotional, that critical
care usually represents. Still, with medical science increasingly capable
of keeping patients alive artificially, the incidence of the need to make
life termination decisions increases. 42 Presently, seventy percent of the
deaths occurring at a hospital result from the termination of treat-
ment.4
3
The disabled may warrant special concern. Representatives of the
disabled have led the opposition to any easing of the life support re-
moval bans (let alone promoting euthanasia) on the ground that de-
valuing life will result in their charges' harm.44 At the least, treatment
will be less heroic; perhaps there will be stronger pressure to accept
the desirability of ending the lives of the disabled. The specter of the
Nazis' elimination of those they called unworthy of life springs to
mind. 45 It may be true of the elderly, in general, that to ease an end
to life is to jeopardize life. No easy answer exists to such problems
except alertness to their possibility. Ultimately, the danger of their
eventuation must be weighed against the pain of keeping those alive
who have decided rationally, without outside pressure, that death with
dignity is preferred. To the author, the latter seems the more difficult
choice to make.
the Right to Die, 65 NoTRE DAm L. REv. 699, 710 (1990) (authored by Irene Prior Loftus)
(discussing Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), wherein the individual patient's
self-determination interest was held to outweigh the state's interest in preserving life, preventing
suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the integrity of medical ethics); see
also Beschle, supra note 1, at 333 (noting that theoretically diverse approaches of Massachusetts
and New York courts on treatment termination both essentially require the court to determine
the choice an incompetent would make were she competent).
39. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 86; Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
40. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 79, 97.
41. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
42. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69, 97.
43. Dying: Fear of Being Suspended in a Vegetative State Has Triggered an Unprecedented
Demand for Living Wills Since High Court Ruling, L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4.
44. See Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan,
50 OEHo ST. L.J. 891, 93845 (1989).
45. K. BINDiNG & A. HocHn, Dm FPtEiABE DER-vERNicHTtINO LEBENSruNWERTEN LEBENS
(Leipzig' 1920).
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An additional countervailing interest is sometimes urged on behalf
of dependent children. 46 The loss of support gets little consideration
in most life support termination cases because the former supporter
generally cannot assist the dependent child either financially or psy-
chologically because of imminent death. A notable exception is that
a majority of states bar the termination of the life supporting care of
a pregnant woman. 47 A few limit such negation of the woman's choice
to pregnancies involving viable fetuses or fetuses that could develop
to viability. 48 The latter seem in line with the present constitutional
resolution of the abortion question. 49 The majority of states, which
negate an advance directive that would lead to the maker's death, seem
dubious. So long as women remain free to choose to have an abortion
in the first trimester for any reason or none at all, imposing a higher
standard of review on terminal patients appears to violate constitu-
tional privacy doctrine as it now stands.
Can it be true that a state has a sufficient interest in a pregnancy
(even one likely doomed by the ill health of the mother) to force a
prospective mother to carry a child whom she probably will not have
46. See Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (sustaining a hospital's administration of
emergency blood transfusion to a patient whose religious convictions prohibited such measures
and whose husband refused to authorize transfusion on similar grounds, when the hospital
was exposed to potential civil and criminal liability for failing to take appropriate action,
when the patient was the mother of a seven-month old child whose "abandonment" it was in
the state's interest to prevent, and when the patient's voluntary presence in the hospital gave
rise to the inference that she wanted her life preserved though she could not "consent" to the
means of doing it).
47. See ARm. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188
(West Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 2503 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-44103
(Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-6 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504
(Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11 (Burns 1990); KI. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103 (1985);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605 (1990); MISS. CODE AN. § 41-41-107 (Supp. 1990);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.610 (Michie
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14 (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp.
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019 (Vernon 1990); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1990); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 1514.03 (West 1989).
48. See A.ASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-206 (Supp. 1989);
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 15-18-104 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202 (1989);
UNIx. RIGHTS OF TERuNALLY ILL ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1990).
49. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (upholding state
statute requiring physicians to perform fetal viability tests on women believed to be at least
twenty weeks pregnant); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (subsequent to viability, state may
regulate and even proscribe abortion except when necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother).
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a chance to nourish? Can the state constitutionally choose between
the two lives and cause the woman's death by procedures designed to
save the child?
Under Roe v. Wade, the state must consider not only the mother's
physical burden of the period of gestation but also the mother's in-
terest in the life she may bring into the world.50 Until a state can es-
tablish a right to interfere in a healthy person's decision not to give
birth, the state should not be allowed to require a woman to give birth
to a child doomed to be motherless. At the moment, the law seems
to bar a state from merely inquiring about the reason for a woman's
decision if she is a competent adult.
Many courts, however, have long recognized an additional in-
terest in the medical profession that impinges on the rights of pa-
tients.-" If physicians, in general, or the specific treating physician object
to a call to cease treatment, that objection often is entitled to some
weight. A majority of states have addressed the possible conflict be-
tween the treating physician and the patient by providing in their phy-
sician directive laws for the transfer of a patient by a doctor offended
by the patient's wishes.5 In many states, however, this conflict remains
unresolved by statute. Although physicians ordinarily are involved in
treatment and, thus, in treatment cessation, their most pressing in-
terests should be satisfied if they are not required to participate in
treatment cessation to which they are opposed. A fair balance between
50. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
51. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589-91 (D.R.I. 1988) (The integrity of
medical ethics is subordinate to the wishes of the patient. If prompt transfer of the patient to
a facility that would respect the patient's wishes is impractical, the objecting hospital must
terminate nutrition and hydration.); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986) (Hospital should not be compelled to withhold food and water contrary to
generally established and accepted medical principles to comply with guardian's wishes. Hospital
must assist guardian in transferring ward to suitable facility where guardian's wishes may be
effected.).
52. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8 (1990); AAsKA STAT. § 18.12.050 (1986); ARz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3204 (1986); ARx. STAT. ANm. § 20-17-207 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1990); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-113 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2427 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-4108 (Harrison
1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-11 (1985); IDAHo CODE § 39-4508 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.8 (west
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107 (1985); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2926 (Supp.
1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-604 (1990); MmIN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (west
Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANNi. § 41-41-115 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030 (Vernon
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6 (Supp.
1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-08 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108 (Supp.
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (1988); WASI. REv.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 (west 1989); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-22-104 (1988).
the pain of a dying patient and a physician's moral code would seem
to justify depriving an offended physician of a more decisive role. A
new act should explicitly adopt the transfer requirements already in
use in a number of states.
Present natural death acts were not written to be all-inclusive.
They typically recite that they do not affect other rights. 3 The natural
death acts were born of a problem newly realized and are riddled with
restrictions presumably attributable to excessive caution and lack of
experience . 4 As a result, express provisions were made for the pos-
sibility of less restrictive treatment at common law. In contrast to the
natural death acts, durable powers actually were borrowed from estate
practice, a field in which they were not a novelty. In asset manage-
ment, durable powers generally carry few restrictions; 51 thus, although
only the basic durable power law has been adopted, few legislative
restrictions attach to health care provisions. In the laws specifically
passed to deal with health care, some of the excessive caution of nat-
ural death acts was carried forward.16 As a general matter, however,
these laws are still much less restrictive than natural death acts.5 7
It is a current curiosity that the strictures of natural death acts
can be avoided by not making a directive at all58 or by creating a du-
rable power. Since the passage of the early natural death acts, there
has been extensive examination of treatment termination issues. Ap-
pellate courts have written thoughtful opinions on the subject to guide
lower courts.5 9 Currently, there are enough carefully reasoned opinions
that each state should be capable of writing a clearer, more compre-
hensive statute.
Natural death acts focus on instructions to physicians. A new law
should have provisions with the same focus. These provisions specif-
ically might contain whatever restrictions the state wishes to impose
on self-determination of death, permitting options and dropping the
present statement that these options are not in derogation of other
rights. Presumably, by drawing on a number of court decisions re-
solving such issues, these restrictions could be significantly less on-
erous than those in present natural death acts. At least the statutes
53. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-110 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9 (1985).
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986) (prohibiting the discontinuation of
medical treatment if the patient is pregnant).
55. WRITING A LiviNG WILL, supra note 7, at 50.
56. See, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 2436.5 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring renewal of durable
power for health care every seven years).
57. See supra note 17.
58. In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 11. 2d 1, 25-28, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1202-03 (1990).
59. Many of the cases are reviewed in Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 78-92.
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should be sufficiently flexible to encourage rather than deter the cre-
ation of directives.
With respect to a wish to have life support terminated, present
natural death act statutes (and even durable power for health care
laws) tend to be quite limited. For example, although statutes generally
allow the removal of respirators and ventilators and the request for
do-not-resuscitate orders by advance directive, most stop short of au-
thorizing means of effecting what is popularly known as death with
dignity.60 No statute authorizes lethal injection, for example, even un-
der circumstances in which a patient may die by withholding medical
aid. Many physician directive statutes forbid the termination of hy-
dration and nutrition even when food and liquids are administered by
intubation. 6' These statutes intentionally discriminate between persons
who have a mortal dependency on medical treatment and those who
will survive if normal needs for food and shelter are provided. Al-
though courts generally have placed tubal nutrition and hydration in
the medical treatment category, 62 physician directive statutes often ap-
pear to prohibit any form of terminating the supply of food and liq-
uids.63
It is curious that physician directive statutes that were spawned
by the plight of Karen Quinlan would not have helped resolve her case.
She, as many after her, was in a coma and might have survived for
an indefinite period so long as food and fluids were continued.6 As
it turned out, she did not, but many patients in persistent vegetative
states may live for decades in that condition, given shelter, food, and
60. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE § 2443 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting provisions for mercy
killing or suicide).
61. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1990); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-206 (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-570 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4102 (Harrison 1986); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-4 (Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-8-11-4 (Bums 1990); IoWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2 (West 1989); KA. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,102
(1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §
5-602 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202
(1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp.
1989); Ox.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.605 (Supp.
1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103
(Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (West 1989);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101 (1988).
62. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 82.
63. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 1989) (life sustaining procedures
that may be terminated "shall not include the administration of medication, sustenance, or
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort or eliminate
pain").
64. Friedrich, A Limited Right to Die, TIME, Jul. 9, 1990, at 59.
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liquids. 65 A few states expressly permit the inclusion of a provision
to terminate food and liquids along with other directives but do not
prohibit such acts without this provision. 66 Some of these states limit
removal authority to documents that expressly so direct. 67
The result, in any event, is curious. Depending upon the form of
statute and the type of patient need, some may have their suffering
ended by using a directive while others may not. If nothing short of
ending feeding and the supply of liquids will result in death, even pa-
tients in states permitting directives to include hydration and nutrition
removal will probably at best die slowly by dehydration. Physicians
are directed to make the patients as comfortable as possible during
that time. 6 Nonetheless, the procedure appears cruel, which suggests
it eventually may be replaced with a more palatable alternative. Active
euthanasia is, of course, still extremely controversial. 69
Even one of the least controversial forms of treatment for ter-
minal patients, do-not-resuscitate orders, may raise difficult problems.
For a variety of reasons, a number of terminally ill people prefer to
die outside of hospitals. They may wish to refuse treatment should
they have heart failure or otherwise be stricken while at home or in
a public place. 70 In such circumstances, do-not-resuscitate orders may
be demanded in advance directives. These orders should not be dif-
ficult to implement in a hospital. In public, on the other hand, they
become very hard to enforce. Emergency medical personnel under-
standably are trained indiscriminately to resuscitate and transport the
victim to a medical facility. Even if other problems concerning the
appropriateness of refusal of life support are solved, it may be un-
reasonable for a person who lives in our society to expect not to be
treated if stricken ill in a public place. The core of the problem is not
65. Id.
66. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West Supp.
1990).
67. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2925 (Supp. 1989).
69. But see Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
307 (1986) (Compton, J., concurring). Compton stated,
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long
as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, in my opinion, include
the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the medical profession, in
making death as painless and quick as possible.
Id.
70. See, e.g., New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate Law, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960,
2978 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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legal but practical. Emergency forces have enough to do without be-
coming concerned with the state of advance directives when they arrive
at the scene. Yet important reasons may justify allowing terminal pa-
tients who can do so to leave hospitals if they wish. For example,
discharging these patients may free needed space, be less expensive,
and allow more contact with loved ones. It seems more civilized to
allow terminal patients a final surrounding of choice rather than the
forced interior of an institution.
One might devise a way to wear identification indicating the wish
not to be resuscitated, but that probably would be ineffective. Emer-
gency personnel might well wonder whether the decision was made
legally and correctly and even who attached the identification. Emer-
gency personnel might want medical input. A registration system with
a central emergency center might handle the problem. Once an ap-
propriate do-not-resuscitate order is issued, the patient would receive
an identification with an index number to be carried on the person
of the patient. The identification could be discovered (ideally by the
person calling for emergency aid) and a radio check on its validity and
the identifying characteristics of the person who made the advance
directive could be obtained from the registry. The check potentially
could be completed before arrival at the scene. At worst, it could be
initiated immediately on contact by emergency personnel. A registra-
tion system should be legislatively authorized. 71
Even under the circumstances most favorable to following an ad-
vance directive, it does not seem likely that a state legislature would
enact a statute that allows lethal injection. Assisting suicide generally
is a criminal act despite the direction of the person who dies.72 In most
of the civilized world, assisted dying is prohibited. 73
The Netherlands is a notable exception: 74 euthanasia is well es-
tablished, but at least at the moment, there appears to be no provision
for assisting foreigners wishing to die. Perhaps that will change. Per-
haps other countries will adopt the position of the Netherlands. Pos-
sibly some states will enact an assisted suicide law. Recently, such an
initiative was proposed in California, but did not make the ballot.75
71. Santa Cruz County, California, has a system for processing advance directives. The
911 emergency operator checks a fMle for registered physician directives before dispatching
emergency aid.
72. See Peters, supra note 44, at 963.
73. See generally Death by Directive, supra note 7.
74. 60 Minutes: The Last Right? (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1986); Washington
State Confronts Euthanasia, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1991, at A7, coL. 2.
75. Proposed "Humane and Dignified Death Act," November 1988.
Public opinion polls seem to favor a similar type of provision for the
terminally ill.76
If a terminally ill person could travel to a place in which active
assistance in dying was provided, would advance directives be allowed
to authorize transportation of the maker for that purpose? This prob-
lem might be anticipated in drafting current documents.
Of course, treatment cessation is not the only issue of concern.
While directives to physicians are limited to life support instructions,
durable powers of attorney also can direct the many medical (and fi-
nancial) issues that can be anticipated to arise on incapacity. An im-
proved advance directive law should allow the maker this option as
well. After all, incompetents may well require a variety of treatments,
and there is no reason to require the appointment of either an agent
or conservator to insure that physicians serve the patient as the patient
wishes. To ensure that the broader potential does not delay addressing
issues relating to dying, the law should allow codicils to expand the
original directive like will codicils. 77
At the same time, teeth should be put into directives to physicians.
So long as the medical community ignored advance directives, the di-
rectives could be seen as either useless or only marginally effective. 78
Such a perception was likely to become self-fulfilling. Life support is
almost invariably supplied in hospitals. Increasingly, the primary site
of death is hospitals. 79 Physicians appear generally to believe that treat-
ment decisions are theirs to make; some even believe that they have
interests which must be balanced against the wishes of their patients.
Some courts agree.80
Undoubtedly, the recent congressional passage of provisions con-
cerning advance directives will address these problems. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 199081 requires Medicare providers to
take an active role in informing patients about their right to participate
in and direct health care decisions and requires providers to encourage
and honor advance health care directives. It further mandates that
each provider maintain written policies82 ensuring that patients are given
written notice of their rights to control medical treatment under state
76. Right to Die: The Publics View, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1990, at A18, col. 2 (81%0 of
persons polled would allow a feeding tube to be removed from a comatose individual with no
brain activity upon the request of family).
77. See J. Rrrcfm, N. ALFORD & R. Em .AD, supra note 23, at 7.
78. See Mayo, supra note 35, at 146.
79. Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69.
80. Note, supra note 38, at 707 n.53.
81. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
82. Id § 4206(0(1).
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law, including the right to make an advance directive, 83 and that pa-
tients' medical records are marked to indicate whether advance di-
rectives exist.84 To ensure that decisions are made freely, the act
prohibits conditioning medical care (or otherwise discriminating) on
whether such a directive has been executed. 85 Finally, the Act provides
that the provider must ensure compliance with both common law and
statutory state law respecting advance directives6 and educate the staff
and the community about advance directives.8 7 When the law becomes
effective in 1992, its impact on issues discussed in this Article should
be substantial.
States may want further to support patient control. To that end
the proposed law might criminalize the refusal to follow a proper di-
rective and make refusal actionable by private injunctive proceedings.
Awarding attorney fees to the winning party may be justifiable and
would dissuade harassing law suits against physicians while enabling
agents without ample resources to pursue actions. Whether these ad-
ditional enforcement measures are required might be best assessed af-
ter the federal law has had a chance to alter present practices. The
routine inquiry about directives by hospitals and others should reduce
the apprehension that patients presently exhibit.
One of the most promising aspects of the congressional provision
is its requirement that medical staffs be educated about advance di-
rectives. If physicians become better informed, they may become ef-
fective promoters of such documents. At the moment, physicians are
not well informed. One study found that eighty-five percent of Cal-
ifornia physicians surveyed either knew nothing or little about advance
directives. 88 It is appropriate to urge a patient to consider making an
advance directive incident to a routine hospital admissions. 89 The rou-
tine exercise of the request will lessen its threatening nature.
Of course, the necessity for a directive stems from the incapacity
of the principal. Some states prohibit anyone from exercising health
care powers while the maker is competent.90 All states allow a com-
83. Id. § 4206(f)C1)(a)(i).
84. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(B).
85. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(C).
86. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(D).
87. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(E).
88. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physician's Responses to
Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REv. 445, 472 (1989).
89. Lowry, Led by Court, Hospitals Take New Interest in Living Wills, N.Y. Times, July
23, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
90. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1990); IDAHo CODE § 39-4505 (Supp.
1990); W. VA. CODE § 13-30A-3 (Supp. 1990).
petent maker to revoke the instrument. A greater problem exists with
respect to a maker who, though now legally incompetent, wishes to
change a directive.
Some statutes at least allow the revocation of authority to remove
life support if the patient can communicate, irrespective of whether
he or she is then thought to be competent. 9' At a minimum, a new
statute should have such a provision. Decisions about competency are
controversial. They should not be allowed to interfere with an an-
nounced decision not to die. After all, had the patient not given au-
thority for a contrary position, life would have been maintained as
a routine application of state law.
The result of revoking the authority to remove life support, how-
ever, is permanent. If an incompetent patient revokes, the presumption
of competence cannot be used to revive the document or make a new
one. There is, in other words, relatively easy revocation but not easy
reinstatement. Although that rule is symmetrical, it is not sensible. The
states presume competency revocation, defying the customary treat-
ment of incompetency for strong policy reasons. The reasons for al-
lowing patient self-determination are also strong. There are alternatives
to voiding the document because of a change of mind. For example,
the document might be considered suspended by the change of mind
and the suspension dropped if the patient again sought its ends. The
absence of continued resistance might end the suspension. Family or
courts might be empowered to reinstate the document, even absent
competent consent, subject to the patient's refusal assuming that the
patient is in a condition to communicate refusal. Thus, the deliberate,
competently chosen outcome would prevail over the effects of hesi-
tation.
A related problem is whether states will require that advance di-
rectives be reexecuted periodically or whether they will allow older
documents to govern conduct at a significantly later time. Most states
allow directives, once valid, to remain in force indefinitely. 92 Cali-
fornia, however, requires their reexecution periodically. 93 Periodic
91. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.020 (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2424 (1989); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 327D-12 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3104 (Supp. 1990).
92. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.05 (West 1989) (providing that a directive is valid
unless revoked or superceded by the express wish of a competent patient).
93. California requires physician directives to be reexecuted every five years. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990) (California requires the reexecution of durable
powers for health care only every seven years. CAL. Crv. CODE § 2436.5 (West Supp. 1990)).
Wisconsin and Idaho had similar requirements for physician directives but dropped them.
IDAHO CODE § 39-4506 (1985) (current version at § 39.4507 (Supp. 1990)); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
1154.03 (West 1989).
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reexecution is necessary only if a person remains competent or regains
competency.
Most physician directive statutes also avoid the problem of out-
dated documents by requiring that the maker be in a terminal con-
dition at the time of execution. 94 The original directive statute, enacted
in California, takes an extreme view by requiring diagnosis of the ter-
minal condition two weeks before the document becomes binding.95
Colorado requires one week. 96 Studies indicate that these waiting pro-
visions effectively bar most people from executing the document. 97
Desires expressed earlier in life or while in better health may over-
exaggerate the limitations that age and infirmity actually impose.
Commonly, many persons happily accept living with physical limi-
tations they once would have thought unbearable. 98 Whether that sup-
ports dismissing an earlier writing is another matter. As the advance
directive represents a position once formally adopted, it likely rep-
resents a deliberate position worthy of implementation. After all, it
could have been revoked by the maker. Alternatively, an intermediate
position could be adopted that would give the advance directive di-
minished effect with the passage of time. 99 Longevity of the document
alone does not justify completely disregarding the expressed views of
the maker.
The third generation advance directive should deal sensitively with
this complex issue. Perhaps the best direction lies in requiring the maker
to specify in the document any desired form of assistance in dying
beyond suspension of medical machinery such as removal of tubal
feeding or suspension of chemotherapy. It might be better to provide
a substitute for starvation and dehydration as the only acceptable means
of allowing a person not dependent on medical machinery to die. Once
we confront the fact that removal of food and water kills all pa-
tients, 1' ° a form of more direct and less gruesome help can be accepted
as an alternative. Careful screening would be required to ensure against
the previously mentioned improprieties.
94. Only Arkansas and Texas allow patients who are not in a terminal condition to
execute advance directives. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (1987); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
95. CAL. HEALTH & SArTY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990).
96. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104 (Supp. 1990).
97. Redleaf, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians'
Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 928 (1979).
98. Peters, supra note 44, at 914.
99. Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 737, 768 n.125.
100. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 84.
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A further word on the implementation of directives to allow dying
is in order. Some consideration must be given to ensuring that a de-
cision to be allowed to die remains acceptable to the patient. Life sup-
port termination decisions may cause almost immediate death, as in
the case of turning off a ventilator for a dependent patient. On the
other hand, they may cause death more slowly, as in the case of the
removal of a feeding tube. 10' In the latter case, there appears to be
no good reason for postponing action once it is determined that the
decision was appropriately made and has not been repudiated. In the
former, it may be wise to provide for a short term postponement to
assure a cooling off period. During the cooling off period anyone who
has the right to object to the procedure, including, of course, the pa-
tient if she can communicate, can effect a change in the cessation of
treatment. Because many people who have made and confirmed a de-
cision to be allowed to die change their mind, the law should allow
a short time, after all other hurdles are crossed, for sober last minute
contemplation.
Whatever choices are made concerning the issues discussed, du-
rable powers of attorney for health care should provide the model for
providing instructions on health care. Comparable provisions should
deal with asset management. No directive can be as effective as an
agent charged with carrying out instructions. The concept is good and
needs little adjustment, but it does require the maker both to craft
a document and to find a trusted agent to make it work. Actually,
regression might be in order because durable power laws were less
complicated when they merely addressed asset management before the
new class of health care durable power laws were passed.
An additional problem of conflict of laws has not yet spawned
reported cases. In an increasingly mobile society, it is unrealistic to
expect that the drafter of advance directives necessarily will be in the
state in which the document was drawn or, for that matter, in her then
home state. A few statutes accommodate that problem by enforcing
a document that is valid in the state in which it was made. 02 Minnesota
accepts a directive that substantially complies with its own law.'0 3 At
the opposite extreme lie California and Oregon, which prescribe a form
to be used or at least prescribe a number of necessary provisions that
101. See id. at 84.
102. ALASKA STAT. § 18-12.090 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-212 (Supp. 1989); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2930 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612 (1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-111 (1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3103.1 (Supp. 1991); UNn'.
RIGHTS OF TERImNALLY ILL ACT § 13, 9B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1990).
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.15 (West Supp. 1990).
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might well be omitted in a draft prepared elsewhere.' ° Worse yet, the
requirements of those states differ from each other. The requirement
that specific provisions or forms be used does not foreclose a court
from accepting a conflicting document made by persons not under the
state's jurisdiction at the time.'05
The great majority of states do not prescribe the precise form or
mandate the inclusion of specific provisions. They allow different forms
and they do not resolve the conflicts of law question. Although their
laws probably raise fewer problems than the restrictive states' statutes,
they are not ideal either. The conflicts question is yet to be resolved,
and it still remains open to the courts to refuse to enforce an out of
state form.
No state appears to require its courts to allow the appointment
of an agent who, because she is located outside the state, may not be
easily amenable to the state's laws. Although a court seemingly could
condition enforcement of a directive on the agent's voluntary com-
pliance with state requirements, the uncertainties involved do not pro-
vide peace of mind for elders. The new law should contain a provision
validating a directive that complies with the requirements of the mak-
er's state of domicile when the directive was made. The state also could
impose other requirements from its own laws if the maker becomes
a domiciliary. Even then, the document should at least be accepted
in any legal proceeding as an indication of the maker's wishes.
Natural death laws do not require the appointment of agents.
That feature removes a nagging problem of durable powers of at-
torney. Many elders may have significant trouble finding a willing and
able agent who is likely to remain healthy and competent. Many elders
have no one. On the other hand, the presence of someone with legal
authority to enforce the patient's wishes increases the likelihood of
those wishes being effectuated. Although physicians must follow phy-
sician directives, patients by definition are incompetent to make-let
alone enforce-their directives when the time comes. Because patients
enforce their own mandates, many physicians likely control the med-
ical fate of their patientsc0 At least, elders may fear that their doc-
uments are ineffectual.
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.610
(Supp. 1990).
105. Some statutes now so provide. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1,
sec. 13 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
106. See Fear of Being Suspended in a Vegetative State Has Triggered an Unprecedented
Demand for Living Wills Since High Court Ruling, L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4.
The third generation living will could resolve the problem by en-
larging the group of persons who are available for selection as at-
torney-in-fact. Since the primary reason for appointing an agent outside
of available family probably is the avoidance of family interference
with an elder's wishes, the agent need not be a close relative of the
elder. It suffices that the person is willing to follow the provisions of
the durable power and that she is competent to act. A corps of vol-
unteers willing to serve such a purpose might be relatively easy to de-
velop since there are already many models of community elder support.
It would seem a worthy project for one of the many community-minded
service organizations to adopt; perhaps funding for the organization
of such groups might be appropriate. The sponsoring group could
undertake training and supervision of volunteers. Laws should be
amended to allow such organizations to be named as either the prin-
cipal agent or as an alternate agent in an advance directive. 0 7
At present, advance directives end at death. It might be wise to
allow an agent-based directive to exist long enough for the agent to
have an autopsy conducted as a means of enforcing predeath medical
directives. 08
One commentator has suggested that the doctrine of cypres might
be adapted to give effect to a maker's perspectives given changed cir-
cumstances.' °9 Thus, the intent of the maker might be effectuated by
substituting a feasible means of execution for one that has become
impossible.
The fact that only those with an advanced education are likely
to use physician directives and powers of attorney supports finding
an appropriate alternative. Physician directive and powers of attorney
put a high premium on expression skills and on experience with legal
documents." 0 Many people made wards under conservatorship laws
107. Health care durable power of attorney laws generally require that the health agent be
a named person. See, e.g., Oregon Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 127.505-.585 (1989).
108. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-7 (Harrison 1990) (agent may be empowered to
make an anatomical gift, authorize an autopsy, or direct the disposition of a principal's
remains); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (unless agency
states an earlier termination date, the agency continues until the death of the principal); KA.
STAT. ANN. § 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1989) (agent may make decisions about organ donation,
autopsy, and disposition of the body); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West Supp. 1990) (since
"health care" needs to cease at death, presumption must be that agency also ceases); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 34-6-201 (Supp. 1990) (health care is limited to treatment decisions, thus creating
the presumption that the agency ends at death).
109. Gelfand, supra note 99, at 794 n.254.
110. Doing Justice to Life; For the Cruzans, Pain for Principle, a Triumph, N.Y. Times,
June 27, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
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likely do not possess either skill. 111 If the law is to apply to all classes,
the new law should provide alternative directions in the event that the
dying person has never provided written directions. Of course, every
effort should be made to facilitate the use of durable powers and di-
rectives, but not providing an adequate alternative is probably insen-
sitive to the differences among people.
A significant problem lies in the small number of directives that
presently are prepared. Death is an unpleasant subject that most peo-
ple avoid discussing or even considering. Although in a recent poll the
majority of those questioned approved of living wills, only fifteen per-
cent had made one." 2 On the other hand, fifty-six percent had in-
formed family members of their wishes." 3 The recently passed of federal
law can be expected to increase the number of directives drawn.
To some extent, it is inappropriate to require that people use these
documents rather than other alternatives when the intent is to promote
self-determination. More effort must be made, however, to lessen the
burden of making directives. State-approved forms, already available
in most states," 4 are useful especially if they do not limit the ability
of the maker to direct conduct in other terms. These forms provide
an inexpensive and uncomplicated means of preserving a person's
wishes.
Whether a thoughtful, literate person would adopt a form might
depend on the extent to which that person had specific concerns that
I11. In the New York study of guardianship, a large number of wards were state charges
who, presumably, often would be undereducated. SuRRoGATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 7.
112. L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4.
113. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv.
1519, 1647 n.35 (1990).
114. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1986); AR=. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3202 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104 (1989); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-575 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.05 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (1986); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-4 (Supp.
1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-12 (Bums 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.3
(West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103 (1985); LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299:58.3 (West
Supp. 1990); ME. REy. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 5-602 (1990); MmN STAT. ANN. § 145B.04 (West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §
41-41-107 (Supp. 1989); Mo. RE. STAT. § 459.015 (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-
103 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 449.610 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137H:3
(Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (Supp. 1990);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-105 (Supp.
1990); TEX. HEALTH & SAFEr CODE ANN. § 672.004 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1104 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5253 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (1988);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102 (1977); UNO.
RIorTs oF Tm TE.mwALLY ILL ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 1990).
would not be protected by the form. In that regard, it would be es-
pecially useful to have an authoritative interpretation of the form pro-
visions enacted along with them. While the interpretations would not
be as binding as the language of the form, they would provide a first
step in dealing with ambiguities. The issue is of sufficient importance
to make form drafting the subject of educational campaigns.
Finally, in the event that a person does not create a physician
directive or durable power appointment, a statute could take care of
problems without the necessity of court intervention. The new statute
might continue to name the persons who would be empowered to act
on behalf of the patient absent a directive and further be broadened
to express the totality of health care the state would allow them to
direct. Depending on the satisfaction with these provisions, a patient
would choose whether to make an alternative document and, if so,
what its provisions should be. Disagreement with the medical care pro-
visions provided in the new statute would trigger at least a physician
directive. If a patient does not trust one of those persons empowered
to act on her behalf, she could appoint an agent.
Improvements in medical technology have made advance direc-
tives far more important than they would have been at an earlier time.' 5
The authorizing laws have been passed quickly, but have not been
coordinated with other state laws. Substantial overlap exists, and yet
significant gaps exist as well. Cases relating to terminal care also have
flourished in the past decade. It is a good time to differentiate and
reorganize the laws that exist. A single package, especially one that
spells out the results of failing to make a directive, would make di-
rectives more useful and, consequently, more likely to be used.
115. Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69.
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